FOREIGN POLICY OF THE ‘POST-SOVIET’ RUSSIA

(My article was published in the Central Eurasian News Letter published by Center for Central Eurasian Studies (University of Mumbai) in November, 2011.)

Two decades have passed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Russia, which became the official successor state of the Soviet Union, has gone through many ups and downs since then. In the immediate aftermath of the dissolution, Russia seemed to be weak and helpless; and was seeking support from the west. Nevertheless, within passage of one decade, she started to reemerge under the dynamic leadership of Vladimir Putin. Today, at the end of the second decade, post-Soviet Russia has emerged as a powerful nation and an important player on the global map.

Though this article is concerned with the Russian foreign policy in the aftermath of the Soviet dissolution, it is essential to go through the developments in the last years of the Soviet rule. The reason for this being that the transformation in Russia’s foreign policy orientation began in the Soviet times itself, with Mikhail Gorbachev becoming the General Secretary of the Soviet Union (1985). He was a young reformist and wanted to change age-old Soviet system. His new foreign policy initiatives were collectively termed as “New Political Thinking”. Firstly, he propagated that the world is ‘integral-interconnected-interdependent’ and the problems of the world can be solved only through cooperation. This meant peaceful coexistence and active cooperation with the west. He was also determined towards reintegration of Russia into the west, through his cries of ‘Common European Home’. Secondly, he talked about futility of arms race and unilaterally gave it up. Most importantly, Gorbachev initiated the ‘de-ideologization’ of foreign policy. The ‘Breznev doctrine’ was renounced, as the democratic revolutions (1989) in the east European countries were not impeded. With Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking, the Soviet state normalized and improvised its relations with the US, China and also other countries like Iran, India.

In the early 1990s, the nationalistic outburst shook almost all the republics in the Soviet Union. Russia, the largest republic in the Soviet Union, was no exception. Yeltsin became the first directly elected president of the Russian republic. He became popular as the ‘Russian’ leader, as against Gorbachev who was known as the ‘Soviet’ leader. Russian economy was stagnated. The ‘subsidy-relations’ with the other republics in the Soviet Union were considered as a burden on Russian economy. Yeltsin argued that the development could be achieved only by giving up this burden and by seeking help from the west.

After the Soviet disintegration, framers of the Russian Foreign policy were left with two ideological choices, Atlanticism and Eurasianism. ‘Atlanticism’ justified the integration of Russia in the western world. It defended adoption of free market economy and liberal polity, leading towards western type modernity, socio-economic prosperity and democracy. On the contrary, there existed another branch called ‘Eurasianism’. They basically believed that Russia is neither fully European nor fully Asian; it has its own unique and distinct culture. Thus, it should assume a greater role as the bridge between the two continents. Moreover, Eurasianists wanted a close relationship with the former Soviet republics and the former Socialist allies.

Immediately after independence, the ‘Atlanticist’ or ‘westernizer’ school of thought gained prominence in Russia’s foreign policy circles. The major reason for this was that President Yeltsin himself was a westernizer. The first post- Soviet Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozirev was also the proponent of this thought. Russia was considered as primarily a European civilization. Yeltsin argued that 74 years of the Soviet rule were the aberration in Russia’s western orientation. He advocated full integration with the western system, by adopting free market economy and liberal democracy. Moreover, there was an argument that current problems could be solved only through the active cooperation with the west. On the other hand, it was considered worthless to maintain close relations with the former east European and Asian allies, especially the republics from Central Asia were considered as the burden.

Thus, there emerged Atlantisist trend in Russian foreign policy in the initial years of Soviet disintegration. This was evident even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia did not support Iraq in the Kuwait crisis (1990-91) despite its close relations with Saddam Hussein. START I was signed between Mikhail Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush (July 1991) to cut nuclear warheads. Yeltsin though, emerged as anti-Gorbachev leader; in practice, his initial foreign policy was an extension of what Gorbachev had started through ‘New Political Thinking’. Most of his moves were aimed at appeasement of the west. However, there is another explanation to Russia’s taking sideline on the international scenario. This was the time when Russia was coping with her domestic problems. The economy had collapsed, and Yeltsin’s ‘Shock Therapy’ economic reforms were underway.

During the first half of the 1990s, Russia maintained minimal relations with the former Soviet republics. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed immediately after the Soviet disintegration, to facilitate smooth transfer of power and cooperate with each other in their economic and political development. This was followed by signing of the Collective Security Treaty in 1992 as a security alliance between the CIS countries. The signatories were Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Russia also signed bilateral agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and maintained partnership in the economic sphere. However, the relations were limited.

Nevertheless, in the mid-1990s, Yeltsin started to realize that, however he begs to the west, they are not going to give Russia position of the equal partner. He was indeed disheartened by the unilateral acts of the US on various occasions. Russia was not conferred with in the Yugoslav crisis. US supported Bosnia in its war of independence against Serbia, which was Russia’s Slavic ally. NATO bombarded Bosnia (1995). At the same time, there occurred some dangerous events in the Asian sphere which could not be ignored. The Civil war in Tajikistan was at its peak. The Taliban seized power in Afghanistan (1996). These events brought up the question of religious radicalism in the Asian continent. In such scenario, ignoring Central Asian neighbors would have been disastrous. Russian Parliament became increasingly agitated with the foreign policy and demanded ousting of foreign minister Andrei Kozirev as he seemed to be appeasing the west. This was seen as the reason for loss of hold over the former Soviet republics.

Yevegyeni Primakov became the foreign minister in January 1996 and then became the prime- minister in September 1998. He himself was an oriental scholar and was a Soviet envoy in West Asia for long time. With his appointment, the ‘Eurasianist’ school of thought gained prominence in Russian foreign policy. Primakov was aimed at expanding influence over former Soviet republics and other Asian powers. He promoted the idea of Russia-China-India triangle, which barely materialized. However, he was successful in bringing the Central Asian region in the Russian sphere. The Tajik civil war was put to an end (1997) with the Russian mediation. The most important foreign policy move during his tenure was the formation of ‘Shanghai Five’ (1996); with Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as the members.

Primakov was succeeded by Vladimir Putin, who first became the prime minister (1999) and then the President (2000) of the Russian Federation. Putin inherited several domestic as well as international problems. At the domestic level, the economic meltdown (1998) had put hardships on Russian society. The second Chechen War (1999) posed serious threat to Russia’s territorial integrity. Internationally, NATO had once again bombarded Serbia in Kosovo war (1999). Moreover, NATO had expanded to include former Warsaw Pact countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (1999).

Putin wanted to reestablish Russia as a global superpower and sought the policy that would promote Russia’s national interest. Putin’s main foreign policy objectives were outlined in the ‘Foreign Policy Concept’ of June, 2000. It had clearly departed from the Atlanticist orientation followed by Kozyrev and ruled out complete reliance on the west for cooperation and support. It also mentioned the threats of unilateralism and establishment of unipolarity. For Putin, Russia’s great power status was more important than anything else. He prompted ideas of patriotism, strong state and social solidarity. In foreign policy, he was guided more by pragmatism.

In the initial years of Putin’s rule, two important developments took place that put Russia back on the international scene. Firstly, there was a steady rise in the prices of crude oil. Russia having vast oil resources benefitted from this rise. The declining economic situation of 1998 received sudden boom as oil prices sky-rocketed. In addition to this, Russia gained bargaining power in the energy market and started using ‘energy diplomacy’ in its international relations. Secondly, the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the US and subsequent attack on Afghanistan brought up the issue of global terrorism. Russia herself affected by the phenomenon declared support to the US in its war on terror. It backed opening of the US air-bases in Uzbekistan (Karshi-Khanabad) and Kyrgyzstan (Manas).

However, Putin was smart enough to understand hidden motives in US’s ‘airbase diplomacy’. Though it appeared to support war in Afghanistan in the short term, in the long run, US was aimed at gaining foothold in Russia’s soft underbelly. In the Iraq issue (2003), Russia went along with France and Germany, and opposed the invasion of Iraq. However, US went unilaterally without accommodating Russian stand; and finally invaded Iraq.

US’s moves in the former socialist space kept raising concerns for Russia. First, US sponsored revolutions and regime changes in former Soviet republics. The Rose Revolution (Georgia, 2003), Orange Revolution (Ukraine, 2004) and Tulip Revolution (Kyrgyzstan, 2005), collectively known as ‘Colored Revolutions’, installed pro-US regimes in these CIS states. Second, NATO was expanded to the east Europe which also included former Soviet states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (2004), bringing NATO close to Russia’s western borders. There are also discussions about giving NATO membership to the CIS countries like Ukraine and Georgia. Third, US President Bush had been talking about installation of the Nuclear Missile Defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, from where Russia can easily be targeted. Lastly, the US has encouraged alternative energy routes to bypass Russia, one example being of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

Nonetheless, Putin has also played intelligent diplomacy to check the US moves. Russia was successful in driving out the US airbases from Uzbekistan (2005) and Kyrgyzstan (2009). For checking the US moves in the region, Russia has also used multi-lateral forums. Formation of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001) with Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as the members has opened up new ‘alliance diplomacy’ in the region. Though SCO claims to be against terrorism, fundamentalism and separatism, there is no doubt that Russia and China intend to check US moves in their neighborhood. Putin has been instrumental in exploiting the differences within European countries and has used ‘energy diplomacy’ to bargain with his European counterparts. Putin emerged as the sturdy opponent of the US unilateralism under President George W. Bush. His picture on the cover page of the Time magazine (January 2008) reaffirmed his popularity.

At the end of Putin’s second term as the President, his junior, Dmitry Medvedev became the President of Russia (May 2008). During initial days of Medvedev’s rule, the relations with the west, prominently with the US, soured because of Russia’s intervention in Georgian the crisis and its support to the break-away republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (August 2008). It was condemned by many western countries. However, regime-change occurred also in US with Barrack Obama becoming the President (January 2009). These two leaders pressed the ‘reset’ button in the US-Russia relations. The New START Agreement (April 2010) was signed between the two countries for nuclear arms reduction. Obama announced that US will not deploy Nuclear Missile Defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. But it is too early to analyze the consequences of the ‘reset’.

Thus, one cannot deny that Russia has transformed from the state of helplessness to that of power and influence. Over the two decades, it has become an important player on the global map. Russia has played significant role in bringing in multi-polarity and democratization in the international organization. Moreover, through various multilateral organizations, like SCO and BRICS, it has engaged other major powers against uni-polarity and US hegemony. In 2012, it is most likely that dynamic Vladimir Putin will come back to the Presidential office. What would be his new foreign policy moves, is the subject of speculation in the scholarly circles everywhere.