(My article was published in the Central Eurasian News Letter published by Center for Central Eurasian Studies (University of Mumbai) in November, 2011.)
Two
decades have passed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Russia, which
became the official successor state of the Soviet Union, has gone through many
ups and downs since then. In the immediate aftermath of the dissolution, Russia
seemed to be weak and helpless; and was seeking support from the west.
Nevertheless, within passage of one decade, she started to reemerge under the
dynamic leadership of Vladimir Putin. Today, at the end of the second decade,
post-Soviet Russia has emerged as a powerful nation and an important player on
the global map.
Though
this article is concerned with the Russian foreign policy in the aftermath of
the Soviet dissolution, it is essential to go through the developments in the
last years of the Soviet rule. The reason for this being that the
transformation in Russia’s foreign policy orientation began in the Soviet times
itself, with Mikhail Gorbachev becoming the General Secretary of the Soviet Union
(1985). He was a young reformist and wanted to change age-old Soviet system.
His new foreign policy initiatives were collectively termed as “New Political
Thinking”. Firstly, he propagated that the world is
‘integral-interconnected-interdependent’ and the problems of the world can be
solved only through cooperation. This meant peaceful coexistence and active
cooperation with the west. He was also determined towards reintegration of
Russia into the west, through his cries of ‘Common European Home’. Secondly, he
talked about futility of arms race and unilaterally gave it up. Most
importantly, Gorbachev initiated the ‘de-ideologization’ of foreign policy. The
‘Breznev doctrine’ was renounced, as the democratic revolutions (1989) in the
east European countries were not impeded. With Gorbachev’s New Political
Thinking, the Soviet state normalized and improvised its relations with the US,
China and also other countries like Iran, India.
In
the early 1990s, the nationalistic outburst shook almost all the republics in
the Soviet Union. Russia, the largest republic in the Soviet Union, was no
exception. Yeltsin became the first directly elected president of the Russian republic.
He became popular as the ‘Russian’ leader, as against Gorbachev who was known
as the ‘Soviet’ leader. Russian economy was stagnated. The ‘subsidy-relations’
with the other republics in the Soviet Union were considered as a burden on
Russian economy. Yeltsin argued that the development could be achieved only by
giving up this burden and by seeking help from the west.
After
the Soviet disintegration, framers of the Russian Foreign policy were left with
two ideological choices, Atlanticism and Eurasianism. ‘Atlanticism’ justified
the integration of Russia in the western world. It defended adoption of free
market economy and liberal polity, leading towards western type modernity,
socio-economic prosperity and democracy. On the contrary, there existed another
branch called ‘Eurasianism’. They basically believed that Russia is neither
fully European nor fully Asian; it has its own unique and distinct culture.
Thus, it should assume a greater role as the bridge between the two continents.
Moreover, Eurasianists wanted a close relationship with the former Soviet
republics and the former Socialist allies.
Immediately
after independence, the ‘Atlanticist’ or ‘westernizer’ school of thought gained
prominence in Russia’s foreign policy circles. The major reason for this was
that President Yeltsin himself was a westernizer. The first post- Soviet Russian
foreign minister Andrei Kozirev was also the proponent of this thought. Russia
was considered as primarily a European civilization. Yeltsin argued that 74
years of the Soviet rule were the aberration in Russia’s western orientation.
He advocated full integration with the western system, by adopting free market
economy and liberal democracy. Moreover, there was an argument that current
problems could be solved only through the active cooperation with the west. On
the other hand, it was considered worthless to maintain close relations with
the former east European and Asian allies, especially the republics from Central
Asia were considered as the burden.
Thus,
there emerged Atlantisist trend in Russian foreign policy in the initial years
of Soviet disintegration. This was evident even before the dissolution of the
Soviet Union. Russia did not support Iraq in the Kuwait crisis (1990-91)
despite its close relations with Saddam Hussein. START I was signed between
Mikhail Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush (July 1991) to cut nuclear warheads.
Yeltsin though, emerged as anti-Gorbachev leader; in practice, his initial
foreign policy was an extension of what Gorbachev had started through ‘New
Political Thinking’. Most of his moves were aimed at appeasement of the west.
However, there is another explanation to Russia’s taking sideline on the
international scenario. This was the time when Russia was coping with her domestic
problems. The economy had collapsed, and Yeltsin’s ‘Shock Therapy’ economic
reforms were underway.
During
the first half of the 1990s, Russia maintained minimal relations with the
former Soviet republics. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was
formed immediately after the Soviet disintegration, to facilitate smooth
transfer of power and cooperate with each other in their economic and political
development. This was followed by signing of the Collective Security Treaty in
1992 as a security alliance between the CIS countries. The signatories were
Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Russia
also signed bilateral agreements with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and
maintained partnership in the economic sphere. However, the relations were
limited.
Nevertheless,
in the mid-1990s, Yeltsin started to realize that, however he begs to the west,
they are not going to give Russia position of the equal partner. He was indeed
disheartened by the unilateral acts of the US on various occasions. Russia was
not conferred with in the Yugoslav crisis. US supported Bosnia in its war of
independence against Serbia, which was Russia’s Slavic ally. NATO bombarded
Bosnia (1995). At the same time, there occurred some dangerous events in the
Asian sphere which could not be ignored. The Civil war in Tajikistan was at its
peak. The Taliban seized power in Afghanistan (1996). These events brought up
the question of religious radicalism in the Asian continent. In such scenario,
ignoring Central Asian neighbors would have been disastrous. Russian Parliament
became increasingly agitated with the foreign policy and demanded ousting of
foreign minister Andrei Kozirev as he seemed to be appeasing the west. This was
seen as the reason for loss of hold over the former Soviet republics.
Yevegyeni
Primakov became the foreign minister in January 1996 and then became the prime-
minister in September 1998. He himself was an oriental scholar and was a Soviet
envoy in West Asia for long time. With his appointment, the ‘Eurasianist’
school of thought gained prominence in Russian foreign policy. Primakov was
aimed at expanding influence over former Soviet republics and other Asian
powers. He promoted the idea of Russia-China-India triangle, which barely
materialized. However, he was successful in bringing the Central Asian region
in the Russian sphere. The Tajik civil war was put to an end (1997) with the
Russian mediation. The most important foreign policy move during his tenure was
the formation of ‘Shanghai Five’ (1996); with Russia, China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as the members.
Primakov
was succeeded by Vladimir Putin, who first became the prime minister (1999) and
then the President (2000) of the Russian Federation. Putin inherited several domestic
as well as international problems. At the domestic level, the economic meltdown
(1998) had put hardships on Russian society. The second Chechen War (1999)
posed serious threat to Russia’s territorial integrity. Internationally, NATO
had once again bombarded Serbia in Kosovo war (1999). Moreover, NATO had
expanded to include former Warsaw Pact countries like Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic (1999).
Putin
wanted to reestablish Russia as a global superpower and sought the policy that
would promote Russia’s national interest. Putin’s main foreign policy
objectives were outlined in the ‘Foreign Policy Concept’ of June, 2000. It had
clearly departed from the Atlanticist orientation followed by Kozyrev and ruled
out complete reliance on the west for cooperation and support. It also mentioned
the threats of unilateralism and establishment of unipolarity. For Putin,
Russia’s great power status was more important than anything else. He prompted
ideas of patriotism, strong state and social solidarity. In foreign policy, he
was guided more by pragmatism.
In
the initial years of Putin’s rule, two important developments took place that
put Russia back on the international scene. Firstly, there was a steady rise in
the prices of crude oil. Russia having vast oil resources benefitted from this
rise. The declining economic situation of 1998 received sudden boom as oil
prices sky-rocketed. In addition to this, Russia gained bargaining power in the
energy market and started using ‘energy diplomacy’ in its international
relations. Secondly, the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the US and subsequent attack
on Afghanistan brought up the issue of global terrorism. Russia herself
affected by the phenomenon declared support to the US in its war on terror. It
backed opening of the US air-bases in Uzbekistan (Karshi-Khanabad) and
Kyrgyzstan (Manas).
However,
Putin was smart enough to understand hidden motives in US’s ‘airbase
diplomacy’. Though it appeared to support war in Afghanistan in the short term,
in the long run, US was aimed at gaining foothold in Russia’s soft underbelly.
In the Iraq issue (2003), Russia went along with France and Germany, and
opposed the invasion of Iraq. However, US went unilaterally without
accommodating Russian stand; and finally invaded Iraq.
US’s
moves in the former socialist space kept raising concerns for Russia. First, US
sponsored revolutions and regime changes in former Soviet republics. The Rose
Revolution (Georgia, 2003), Orange Revolution (Ukraine, 2004) and Tulip
Revolution (Kyrgyzstan, 2005), collectively known as ‘Colored Revolutions’,
installed pro-US regimes in these CIS states. Second, NATO was expanded to the
east Europe which also included former Soviet states of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania (2004), bringing NATO close to Russia’s western borders. There are
also discussions about giving NATO membership to the CIS countries like Ukraine
and Georgia. Third, US President Bush had been talking about installation of
the Nuclear Missile Defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, from where
Russia can easily be targeted. Lastly, the US has encouraged alternative energy
routes to bypass Russia, one example being of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
Nonetheless,
Putin has also played intelligent diplomacy to check the US moves. Russia was
successful in driving out the US airbases from Uzbekistan (2005) and Kyrgyzstan
(2009). For checking the US moves in the region, Russia has also used
multi-lateral forums. Formation of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001)
with Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as the
members has opened up new ‘alliance diplomacy’ in the region. Though SCO claims
to be against terrorism, fundamentalism and separatism, there is no doubt that
Russia and China intend to check US moves in their neighborhood. Putin has been
instrumental in exploiting the differences within European countries and has
used ‘energy diplomacy’ to bargain with his European counterparts. Putin
emerged as the sturdy opponent of the US unilateralism under President George
W. Bush. His picture on the cover page of the Time magazine (January 2008)
reaffirmed his popularity.
At
the end of Putin’s second term as the President, his junior, Dmitry Medvedev
became the President of Russia (May 2008). During initial days of Medvedev’s
rule, the relations with the west, prominently with the US, soured because of
Russia’s intervention in Georgian the crisis and its support to the break-away
republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (August 2008). It was condemned by many
western countries. However, regime-change occurred also in US with Barrack
Obama becoming the President (January 2009). These two leaders pressed the
‘reset’ button in the US-Russia relations. The New START Agreement (April 2010)
was signed between the two countries for nuclear arms reduction. Obama
announced that US will not deploy Nuclear Missile Defense system in Poland and
the Czech Republic. But it is too early to analyze the consequences of the
‘reset’.
Thus,
one cannot deny that Russia has transformed from the state of helplessness to
that of power and influence. Over the two decades, it has become an important
player on the global map. Russia has played significant role in bringing in
multi-polarity and democratization in the international organization. Moreover,
through various multilateral organizations, like SCO and BRICS, it has engaged
other major powers against uni-polarity and US hegemony. In 2012, it is most
likely that dynamic Vladimir Putin will come back to the Presidential office.
What would be his new foreign policy moves, is the subject of speculation in
the scholarly circles everywhere.